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Treaties in the United States
I. INTRODUCTION
Following over a century of precedent, United States courts
refuse to enforce the provisions of treaties which conflict with later
Congressional acts.' Case law and commentary uniformly support
the "last-in-time" doctrine virtually without exception.2 The most
recent Restatement of Foreign Relations Law summarizes well es-
tablished principles:
An act of Congress that is enacted after a rule of interna-
tional law or an international agreement is in force for the
United States supersedes an inconsistent provision of interna-
tional law or agreement as law of the United States, if the pur-
pose of Congress to supersede the earlier provision is clearly ex-
pressed or if the act and the earlier provision cannot be
reconciled.'
1. The earliest recorded Supreme Court opinion stating the last-in-time rule is The
Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871) borrowing the analysis of a lower court in
Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799). Two recent decisions
applying the rule at the appellate level involved a conflict between a 1953 friendship treaty
with Japan and the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Spiess v. Itoh, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981) and
Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981).
2. 87 C.J.S. TREATIES, § 18 (1954); S. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND EN-
FORCEMENT (2d ed. 1916) [hereinafter cited as CRANDALL, TREATIES]; E. CORWIN THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1964 ed.) [hereinafted cited as CORWIN, CONSTI-
TUTION]; R. MACBRIDE, TREATIES VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION (1955); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1955) [hereinafter cited as HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS].
There has been one major challenge to the rule: P. Potter, Relative Authority of Interna-
tional Law and National Law in the U.S., 19 A.J.I.L. 315 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Pot-
ter, National Law]. PEEGLER, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES (1928) responded to Potter, but there has been little subsequent support or
comment.
3. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (revised) § 135
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
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This paper challenges that prevailing maxim and supports an
alternative norm of Constitutional law, a principle of treaty prior-
ity. Article VI of the United States Constitution, designates the
Constitution, laws and treaties as the supreme law of the land,
without indicating any hierarchy or relative superiority. In Mar-
bury v. Madison,'4 Marshall reasoned that the Constitution could
not be altered by the terms of a law which is in conflict. Moreover,
treaties may not conflict with the express provisions of the Consti-
tution and are invalid should they clash. For a century, U.S. courts
have wrongly concluded that laws and treaties, both inferior to the
Constitution, are on a par with each other. To the contrary, basic
principles of Constitutional law dictate that Congress may not vio-
late self-executing treaties by statute. U.S. officials must comply
with the procedures for termination, withdrawal, suspension or
amendment provided in the treaty or by international law. U.S.
courts should follow a principle of treaty priority and enforce self
executing treaties against violations by either Congress or the
President.
In support of that alternative principle of treaty priority this
paper examines the origin, evolution and application of the last-in-
time rule. After identifying points of agreement with prevailing au-
thority, the text affirms a principle of treaty priority which chal-
lenges five key elements of the last-in-time rationale.
II. LAST-IN-TIME: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION
A. Origins
In the absence of any controlling precedent, the lower court
which first applied the last-in-time doctrine based its decision on
original analysis. In Taylor v. Morton, plaintiffs claimed that im-
port duties under the Tariff Act of 1842 violated an 1832 treaty
with Russia.5 Writing for the Circuit Court, Justice Curtis ac-
knowledged that the language of article VI established no clear pri-
ority between laws and treaties. Reasoning that the legislature had
the power to repeal prior laws, the Court concluded that the power
was not limited to the President and Senate. Congress could effec-
tively repeal treaties by a declaration of war, so the power to annul
might also be exercised by enacting contrary legislation. If bound
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1804).
5. 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799), afl'd., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862).
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to foreign powers irrevocably by treaty obligations, the nation
would surrender an essential attribute of sovereignty.
In a 1925 article, Pitman Potter attacked the court's rationale
observing: "There is no 'prerogative' to violate treaties in any cir-
cumstances. Under appropriate circumstances treaties may be ab-
rogated in proper form by proper authorities." The court in Tay-
lor v. Morton simply accepted the allegations of inconsistency
between treaty and statute without attempting to reconcile their
provisions. Potter argues further that the court erroneously re-
garded the Congressional act abrogating the 1788 treaty with
France as a precedent for its decision. The revocation, he insisted,
had no legal effect in international law. One other lower court
adopted the last-in-time rationale before the Supreme Court ac-
cepted the rule in 1871.'
An 1866 treaty provided: "Every Cherokee shall have the right
to sell any products of his farm without restraint. . . paying any
tax for sales outside the (Indian) territory." Congress subsequently
enacted a tax on distilled spirits and tobacco "produced anywhere
within the exterior boundaries of the U.S." In Cherokee Tobacco,
Justice Swayne recalled Marshall's holding that treaties with "do-
mestic dependent nations" lacked the force of agreements with for-
eign states.8 The Court then simply embraced the Taylor v. Mor-
ton opinion, reasoning that if Congress could alter treaties with
foreign powers, the same power must surely apply to dependent
nations.
If the Court had wished to resurrect the dependent nation for-
mulation Marshall had abandoned in later cases, that ground alone
would have been sufficient basis for the decision without establish-
ing a last-in-time precedent.9 Perhaps the Court used the last-in-
time doctrine so that unlike Marshall's earlier holding, the Chero-
kee treaty would override inconsistent state laws. Yet even that
result did not require accepting a last-in-time rule for agreements
with foreign nations. The doctrine would have been limited to In-
dian treaties. Moreover, only four justices joined the "majority" es-
6. In re Potter, supra note 2, at 320.
7. Clinton Bridge, 5 F. Cas. 1060 (C.C. Iowa 1867) (No. 2,900), afJ'd. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
454 (1872).
8. The Cherokee Tobacco, supra note 1.
9. The following year, Congress deprived the Indian tribes of their status as foreign
nations in legislation which provided that no further treaties would be negotiated. See 1
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (1906).
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tablishing the last-in-time precedent. Two justices dissented and
three others abstained. The dissenters argued that Congress never
intended to breach the recent Cherokee Treaty and challenged
Swayne's argument that a tax free zone in Indian Territory would
defeat the purpose of the act.
The Court's uncritical acceptance of the lower court rationale
contrasts sharply with Marshall's careful analysis justifying
supremacy of the Constitution over statutes in Marbury v.
Madison. The opinion unnecessarily sustained a rule negating trea-
ties with a foreign sovereign for a decision involving American In-
dians. The Court neither considered the intent of the framers nor
forecast the possible consequences of the new rule. A minority of
justices on a divided court determined that collection of a tobacco
tax in Cherokee territory justified a doctrine that Congress could
violate treaties with foreign states. Such casual disregard for inter-
national agreements under the Articles of Confederation had so
embarrassed the new nation's leaders that they formed "a more
perfect union" which made treaties the supreme law of the land.10
Over a century of later case law now supports the Cherokee prece-
dent, much of it citing without review a judically created error in
Constitutional doctrine.
B. Indian Treaties
The Supreme Court helped break the trail of broken treaties
in four later cases involving direct conflict between Indian treaties
and Congressional acts. Applying an 1890 statute granting state-
hood, the Court permitted Wyoming to regulate Indian hunting in
violation of an 1869 treaty.1 The Cherokee lost two more decisions
stripping them of treaty lands and the right to self government
based on Congressional acts of the 1890's.2 Most recently, in 1979,
Justice Marshall held that 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360 granting state courts
partial jurisdiction over Indians superseded an 1855 treaty with
the Yakima."3
The Indian decisions have unfortunately reinforced and
strengthened the last-in-time doctrine and are often cited without
10. Potter, supra note 2.
11. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
12. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445
(1899).
13. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes, 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
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reference to the unique national relationships." If the last-in-time
rule has any justification in American jurisprudence, the Court
should limit its application to Indian treaties.'"
C. Application of the Rule
Apart from the five decisions involving Indian treaties re-
ported above, the Supreme Court has found irreconcilable conflict
between treaty and statute in very few other decisions. The Court's
frequent restatement of the last-in-time rule as obiter dicta in
many other cases where the justices reconciled treaty and statute
carry little precedential value. Ironically, the most frequently cited
formulation of the docrine appears in Whitney v. Robertson, a case
where the last-in-time rule did not determine the result.'8
1. Chinese Exclusion. The most significant treaty litigation in-
volving the largest number of foreign nationals resulted from Con-
gressional efforts to bar Chinese laborers from the U.S. between
1880 and 1910. China and the U.S. ratified the Burlingame Treaty
in 1868 and modified it in 1880. As a most favored nation, China's
citizens could travel and work in the U.S. free of discrimination.
Approximately one hundred thousand Chinese laborers settled in
the West, living apart in culturally distinct communities.
Growing resentment against the unskilled, low paid aliens
prompted the first exclusionary legislation in 1882. Chinese labor-
ers leaving the U.S. had to apply for certificates to re-enter. Then
to prevent re-entry, Congress revoked the certificates previously
granted in 1888. Following a blanket prohibition on all immigra-
tion by Chinese laborers in 1892, the U.S. negotiated a new treaty
in 1894 terminating what remained of the old agreement.17
In two major last-in-time decisions, the Supreme Court sus-
14. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW at 739 reports that Marshall himself en-
couraged Justice Thompson to dissent from his dependent nation formulation, later apolo-
gized for his opinion and then narrowed its scope in a subsequent decision.
15. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) the Court held that Geor-
gia state law could have no force in Cherokee territory.
16. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). Several New York merchants challenged
a Congressional act granting Hawaiian sugar duty-free entry. The Court determined that
the United States' unique relationship with Hawaii as well as the special concessions
granted by the King of the island territory distinguished it from most favored nation treat-
ment under commercial agreements.
17. CRANDALL, TREATIES, supra note 2, at 470-81. In 1978, President Carter continued
the tradition by terminating the U.S. treaty with Taiwan, although in that case Senator
Goldwater and others sought unsuccessfully to honor the agreement with China.
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tained Congressional acts denying individual rights under the 1880
treaty. In 1889, the Court upheld the exclusion of Chinese laborers
with re-entry permits.'" Under the 1892 law, the Court also sus-
tained the deportation of a Chinese immigrant unable to obtain
the testimony of a white witness to prove the required length of
residence. 19 Numerous other decisions involving Chinese immi-
grants did not require application of the last-in-time rule, although
the Court formally recognized the doctrine. In several cases, the
Court read the statute narrowly to protect Chinese rights under
the treaty. 0 In other cases, the Court narrowly construed the
treaty so that enforcement of the statute caused no direct
conflict."1
The nation could have achieved the same result without ele-
vating to a principle of Constitutional doctrine, a Congressional
right to violate international law. China proved an obliging ally,
accepting new terms proposed by the United States in 1894.
Thereafter, the Court found no treaty bar to further deportation
under the earlier statute.2" By nullifying state laws which violated
China's treaty rights,23 the Court applied a double standard that
permitted Congress to breach not only the treaty but the Constitu-
tion as well. In the often praised Yick Wo decision, the Court ex-
tended equal protection guarantees of the 14th amendment to Chi-
nese laundries by striking down discriminatory state laws in
California."' Congress also violated the supreme law of the land,
the treaty, and the Court could have enforced that law until the
treaty was properly modified or teminated. Renegotiation of the
Chinese treaty in accord with the rules of international law and
Constitutional requirements involved only minimal delay. The
last-in-time rationale was used to justify unconstitutional acts of
18. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
19. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
20. In Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884) the Court reconciled the Chi-
nese restriction acts of May 6, 1882 (22 Stat. 58) and July 5, 1884 (23 Stat. 115) with the
Treaty of 1880 allowing a laborer who had left before the permits were required or issued to
return without a certificate after the law took effect. See also United States v. Gue Lim, 176
U.S. 459 (1900) where the Court allowed a merchant who had a certificate to return to the
United States with his wife and children who did not have certificates.
21. United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902). Since the treaty did not ex-
pressly prohibit deportation, and stated a general willingness of China to cooperate in
resolving potential disputes, the Court sustained a deportation order under the Act.
22. Id. at 216.
23. Baker v. City of Portland, 2 F.Cas. 472 (C. C. Oregon, 1879) (No. 777); see also
CRANDALL, TREATIES, supra note 2, at 472.
24. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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racial prejudice and parochial nationalism.
2. Peace Treaties. In two cases the Court upheld Congressional
acts rescinding peace treaty commitments. Ironically, the Nation's
founders had framed a Constitution at least in part to honor simi-
lar treaty obligations. Their descendants, victorious in two later
wars, rationalized that the last-in-time rule excused violation of
alien property and treaty rights. The Treaty of Guadelupe-Hidalgo
which ended the Mexican-American War guaranteed Spanish land
grants in territory acquired by the U.S. Under an 1851 Congres-
sional act, a land claims board disregarded prior titles in awarding
a disputed ranch. The Court's extreme formulation of the last-in-
time rule in Botiller v. Dominguez defeats the purpose of the Con-
stitution's framers and violates the express language of articles III
and VI: "The United States Supreme Court has no power to set
itself up as the instrumentality for enforcing the provisions of a
treaty with a foreign nation which the government of the United
States, as a sovereign power, chooses to disregard."25
A similar decision emasculated the treaty ending the Spanish-
American War. Acting under Congressional authorization, the mili-
tary governor for Puerto Rico removed a local officer from a posi-
tion guaranteed by the treaty.26 As a result of its military suc-
cesses, the U.S. became a major world power but lost sight of
fundamental legal principles. The unfortunate violation of two
peace treaties brought little gain to the U.S. for the cost to a na-
tional tradition of honoring treaties and principles of sound
jurisprudence.
3. Commercial Agreements. The other major Supreme Court
decisions determined by the last-in-time rule involved a
Congressionally mandated head tax of fifty cents on all aliens en-
tering the U.S. The Court determined the 1882 act superseded any
.prior friendship treaties barring discrimination against foreign na-
tionals.2 7 Applying the familiar rationale, the opinion upheld the
legislature's power to repeal statutes and judged laws and treaties
had equal force. As in the few other decisions where the rule actu-
ally determined the result, the costs appear to outweigh any poten-
tial benefit. Congress might have found means compatible with the
friendship treaties by charging U.S. citizens the same tax or by
25. Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889).
26. Alvarez y Sanchez v. United States, 216 U.S. 167 (1910).
27. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
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abandoning the levy to honor treaty commitments.
At no time have the courts sanctioned Congressional violation
of a treaty because a vital national interest was at stake. Rather,
the courts have sacrificed the nation's interest in the rule of law for
ends that could have been achieved by alternative means or for
insignificant benefits not worth the cost.
D. Qualifying the Rule
Recognizing that uncritical application of the last-in-time rule
could damage the national interest, the Court has established two
qualifications. First, the U.S. does not escape its international obli-
gations under a treaty when Congress enacts contrary provisions.
The legislature violates but does not abrogate the pact; only the
foreign state affected, not the U.S. courts, can enforce a remedy.
Just as Italy remained liable to the U.S. under terms of a treaty it
had violated, so American officials remain liable after Congress has
nullified the treaty's effect as domestic law.2 8 The Restatement
provides: "[tihe superseding of a rule of international law or a pro-
vision of an international agreement as domestic law of the United
States by a subsequent act of Congress does not relieve the United
States of its international obligation or of the consequences of vio-
lation. 1 9 That formulation hypocritically affirms international law
while rendering treaties unenforceable in U.S. courts, contrary to
the mandate of articles III and VI.
Second, Congress must clearly intend to supersede the treaty,
so that repeals by implication are never favored. "Treaties are to
be construed liberally and courts don't lightly attribute to Con-
gress the intent to abrogate."' Justice Harlan in Chew Heong v.
U.S. made the most forthright declaration of principle: "Aside
from the duty of the Constitution to respect treaty stipulations
. . . the honor of the Government and people of the U.S. is in-
volved in every inquiry." Harlan cites Vattel's argument that there
would no longer be any commerce between mankind if they did not
28. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913) dealt with the Italian treaty.
29. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at § 135.
30. United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446 (1924). The Indian Allotment Act giving indi-
vidual Indians parcels of grange land was not meant to preclude allotments under the 1855
Treaty allowing individuals to receive timberland. See also Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) where the Termination Act of 1954 ending federal super-
vision of the tribe was reconciled with an 1854 treaty granting Indians hunting rights, thus
barring state regulation of these rights.
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think themselves obliged to keep faith with each other: "Courts
uniformly refuse to give to statutes a retrospective operation
whereby rights previously vested are injuriously affected unless
compelled to do so by language so clear and positive as to leave no
room to doubt that such was the intention of the legislature."3
The Court's strained effort to mitigate while saving the last-
in-time rule appears particularly tortured in Cook v. U.S. The 1922
Prohibition Act claimed U.S. jurisdiction over vessels smuggling li-
quor twelve to twenty-five miles from shore. In 1924, treaties with
England and Panama limited jurisdiction to U.S. coastal waters.
Although Congress reenacted the 1922 law in 1930, the Court
found no intent to abrogate the treaty and barred prosecution
under the statute outside the three-mile limit.32 The Court has also
enforced several Indian treaties by concluding that Congress had
not intended to breach those agreements with new law.
33
Two circuits have recently reviewed plaintiffs' claims of em-
ployment discrimination under the 1964 Civil Rights Act against a
defense by Japanese employers based on a 1953 Friendship Treaty.
Both courts sustained the firms' treaty rights to employ Japanese
nationals in managerial positions by qualifying the last-in-time
rule. In Spiess v. Itoh, the fifth circuit concluded that Congress did
not expressly intend to revoke the treaty so that its provisions sur-
vived the later act.3' By contrast, the second circuit in Avigliano v.
Sumitomo Shoji decided the act did supercede the treaty, but sug-
gested that Japanese citizenship might be a bona fide occupational
qualification allowed by the law. 35
The language and rationale qualifying the last-in-time rule
also support the principle of treaty priority. Congress rarely makes
its intent explicit. The 1883 Import Act provided that nothing
"shall in any way change or impair the force and effect of any
treaty between the U.S. and any other government, or any laws
passed for execution of a treaty, so long as such treaty shall remain
in force in respect to the subjects embraced in the act.30 Usually
31. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 539 (1884).
32. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933). The main question involved was
whether section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1930 was modified as applied to British vessels
suspected of being engaged in smuggling liquors into the United States by the United
States-British Treaty of May 22, 1924 (43 Stat. 1761).
33. See supra note 28.
34. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
35. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981). See also Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
36. Tariff Act of 1883, Section 11 (22 Stat. at Large 525), cited in Netherclift v. Robert-
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the courts are left guessing with no clear indication whether an ap-
parent conflict was intended or deliberate. Justices differ on the
Congressional purpose and reach inconsistent decisions. The clear-
est and only Constitutional method for a Congress to alter treaty
law is to follow the agreement's provisions or general principles of
international law.
III. THE TREATY PRIORITY ALTERNATIVE
Published commentary in U.S. law journals, legal encyclope-
dias and treatises uniformly accepts the last-in-time rule as one
element in a broad analytic framework. 7 The principle of treaty
priority challenges only one aspect of prevailing doctrine and sup-
ports the following well established rules of treaty construction.
A. Points of Agreement with Prevailing Authority
1. Supremacy Over State Law. Treaties are always supreme
over state constitutions and statutes, whether those are enacted
prior to or after the international agreement."
2. Self-Executing Treaties. Self-executing treaties prevail over
prior Congressional statutes whenever a direct conflict exists.3"
3. Non Self-Executing Treaties. Treaties which are not self-
executing require Congressional acts of implementation that may
be repealed or amended by later statutes. According to the Re-
statement: "[ain international agreement is 'non-self-executing' if
the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become ef-
fective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing
legislation, or in those rare cases where implementing legislation is
constitutionally required."" Article I, section 9 of the Constitution
son, 27 F. 737, 739 (C.C.N.Y. 1886).
37. Few have disputed that authority. Potter, in National Law, supra, note 2, endorsed
the principle of treaty priority in 1925; R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964) centers primarily on the development of customary in-
ternational law. R. Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Promoting International
Human Rights Norms, 1 N.Y.L. SCH. LAW REV. 153 (1978) calls for a reexamination of the
last-in-time rule and cites a speech by Burgenthal endorsing treaty priority. The Reporter's
notes to the Restatement, supra note 3, mention some support for giving effect to prior
treaties, particularly multilateral agreements.
38. Ware v. Hylton, 9 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); Haunstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483
(1880); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
39. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 253 (1829); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
40. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at 151, para. 4.
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provides: "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in con-
sequence of appropriations made by law." Thus, treaties depen-
dent on appropriations can never be self-executing. Similarly, in-
ternational agreements creating international crimes or requiring
certain punishment would need Congressional statutes "before an
individual could be tried or punished.""' On the other hand, extra-
dition treaties which impose a duty directly on the courts, and
commercial agreements which bar discriminatory legislation by
Congress are immediately self-executing. Multilateral conventions
and human rights treaties may be self-executing in some respects
while requiring implementing legislation for other provisions.
4. Constitutional Supremacy. The treaty priority principle
does not set international agreements above the Constitution, but
only above later acts of Congress. As stated in Reid v. Covert, valid
treaties must comply with the express provisions of the Constitu-
tion. "2 None have ever been found to violate that supreme law.
The principle of treaty priority, like the last-in-time rule, finds
no conclusive support in the "plain meaning" of article VI. While
Potter read the article to mean treaties need not even conform to
the Constitution, Corwin suggests the supreme laws may have been
listed in descending order of priority - Constitution, laws and
last, treaties.43 Generally, the case law and published commentary
properly acknowledge that the ambiguous language can support
different interpretations." The Constitutional rationale invariably
embraces a larger set of logical and legal principles where the
treaty priority principle challenges the last-in-time rule on five key
points.
B. Points Disputed and Principles Affirmed
1. Expression of the Sovereign Will. The last-in-time rule
claims to follow the maxim: leges posteriores contraries abrogant,
the last expression of the sovereign will must control. Congres-
sional acts approved by both houses and the President provide a
more reliable expression of the sovereign will than agreements ne-
gotiated by the President and ratified by the Senate.
41. Id. at 48.
42. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
43. CORWIN, CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 473 n. 65.
44. See Justice Curtis' opinion in Taylor v. Morton, supra note 1; HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, supra note I at 163: "The equality of law of treaties and statutes seems hardly
inevitable; surely there is no basis for it in the Supremacy Clause."
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In response, the treaty priority principle argues that the last
expression of the sovereign will does not supersede provisions of
the U.S. Constitution, unless the current sovereign powers amend
that charter in accord with Constitutional procedures. However
undemocratic it may appear to bind twentieth century representa-
tives of fifty states by decisions of a few made two hundred years
ago, the nation wisely respects those Constitutional limits. The
drafters considered and rejected proposals to involve the House in
treaty ratification and created a Constitutional system that en-
trusts some elements of sovereign power to the Senate and
President.
Frequently authorities using the "sovereign will" argument to
justify Congressional violation of treaties, nevertheless insist the
House cannot refuse to implement a treaty after ratification.4
Whatever Constitutional imperative mandates House implementa-
tion would also prohibit a later breach by Congress. The claim that
failure to implement is distinguishable from a later breach appears
inconsistent, as both have the same effect under international law.
2. Surrender of Legislative Power. If treaties become domestic
law that Congress cannot repeal by ordinary statute, then our gov-
ernment must obtain the consent of foreign states to legislate. Ab-
sent the protection of a last-in-time rule, a nation surrendering
such authority over its own law would cede an essential attribute
of sovereignty.
Since the treaty priority principle applies only to self-execut-
ing treaties, no such loss of sovereignty could result under agree-
ments requiring Congressional implementation (as defined by U.S.
officials). Furthermore, self-executing treaties remain subject to
construction and enforcement by national courts. Most important,
treaties don't strip a nation of the right to escape from intolerable
international obligations. The U.S. government has repeatedly ab-
rogated or modified international agreements using a variety of
lawful methods, some of which did not require another state's
consent.
Some treaties terminate automatically after a fixed period. Ar-
ticle VI of the 1894 Immigration Treaty with China provides "this
convention shall remain in force for a period of ten years." Other
treaties, such as the Nuclear Test Ban of 1963, allow for unilateral
termination by either party after notice. The Restatement indi-
45. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 2, at 168.
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cates that the U.S. President can denounce an "agreement which
contains no provision for termination ... [if] it is established the
parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or with-
drawal or a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by
the nature of the agreement."4 Further, the U.S. can terminate or
suspend an agreement following breach by another party 7 or as a
result of a fudamental change of circumstances not foreseen by the
parties which transforms the extent of obligations."
In the past, Congress has effectively directed the President to
terminate a treaty,49 and the executive branch has also revoked
commitments without Congressional instruction.5 0 In several in-
stances, Presidents sought authorization from Congress to termi-
nate"1 and in other cases refused a Congressional directive to abro-
gate.5 In neither situation was a change in law dependent on the
consent of another nation. A declaration of war by Congress also
effectively suspends the operation of treaties with enemy states for
the duration of the conflict. The treaty priority principle upholds
the U.S. sovereign power to revoke treaties, but insists that the
government abrogate, not violate such agreements in accord with
principles of law. Honoring established termination procedures has
not injured the national interest.
As a result of its diplomatic prowess, the U.S. can frequently
negotiate more favorable terms without strong objection from a
weak, obliging treaty partner. In 1879, President Grant vetoed a
Congressional directive that he renegotiate the Burlingame Treaty
with China; the following year he submitted a revised treaty to the
Senate for ratification. Similarly, President Taft, when pressed by
46. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at §§ 340 and 352.
47. Id. at § 345.
48. Id. at § 346.
49. CORWIN, supra note 2, at 474; the La Follette-Furuseth Seaman's Act of 1915 di-
rected President Wilson "within ninety days after passage of this act, to give notice to for-
eign governments that so much of any treaties as might be in conflict with the provisions of
the act would terminate on the expirations of the periods of notice provided for in such
treaties."
50. President Carter terminated the U.S. treaty with Taiwan in 1978.
51. CoRwIN, supra note 2, at 474. An 1846 joint resolution requested by the President
gave him discretion to notify the British government of the abrogation of the 1827 Conven-
tion on the occupation of the Oregon territory.
52. Id. Wilson disregarded the Jones Merchant Marine Act of 1920 stating he "did not
deem the direction contained in section 34. . .an exercise of any constitutional power pos-
sessed by Congress." See Reeves, The Jones Act and the Denunciation of Treaties, 15
A.J.I.L. 33 (1921); and HENKIN, supra note 2, at 419.
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the House, successfully renegotiated the Russian Treaty of 1832.83
In reviewing the various treaties nullified by the last-in-time rule,
none appeared to create an irrevocable bond to a situation that
adversely affected a vital national interest.
The principle of treaty priority does not impair U.S. sover-
eignty. The last-in-time rule, by contrast, dishonors the nation, as
U.S. officials rationalize treaty violations to other states. A 1957
State Department response, for example, struggled to explain to
the Swiss government why its nationals in the U.S. were compelled
to do military service despite an exemption in an 1850 Convention
that remained in force. 4
Two European states with no less concern for their national
sovereignty nevertheless have Constitutional provisions giving
treaties priority over subsequent legislation. In contrast to the am-
biguity of article VI in the U.S. Constitution, article 55 of the 1955
French Constitution and articles 65-66 of the Netherlands Consti-
tution give treaties effect over later statutes.55
3. Non-Justiciable Political Questions. The courts have long
recognized and respected foreign policy as the preserve of the exec-
utive. The decision to violate a treaty is a policy matter not a legal
question subject to resolution by the courts. Disputes between the
executive and Congress on foreign policy or differences with other
nations are non-justiciable political questions, so it is argued the
courts should refuse jurisdiction. As creatures of U.S. national gov-
ernment, the courts are not agents of the international legal order.
As such, they must not enforce the rights of alien powers against
our own officials. Unity is essential for national survival."
In response, Lillich attacks the "dualist approach": "[tihe
courts ultimately must reassess the precedents by which interna-
tional law although doctrinally incorporated into the law of the
United States, actually is accorded second class status."57 The U.S.
claims to be governed by the rule of law, yet asserts as a legal prin-
53. CRANDALL, TREATIES, supra note 2, at 474 n.2.
54. 1 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OP INTERNATIONAL LAW, 567-68 (1963). The Universal Military
Training Act required all foreign nationals who declared an intent to become U.S. citizens to
serve in the military.
55. Supra note 3 (Reporter's Notes to § 135).
56. L. Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COL. L.
R. 805 (1964).
57. R. Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order,
11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 12-18 (1970).
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ciple the right to violate international law. However rationalized,
the last-in-time rule baldly asserts that disregard for legally valid
treaty commitments cannot be remedied under the U.S. system.
The nation cannot benefit from such a double standard, but must
experience the same disrepute which afflicted the states under the
Articles of Confederation.
The Reporter's notes to the Restatement indicate that despite
his oath of office, the President may disregard treaty duties as
well." The principle of treaty priority insists to the contrary that
courts have a constitutional mandate to enforce treaties as the su-
preme law. The executive and legislative branches have ample al-
ternative means to terminate treaty commitments independent of
judicial review.
By enforcing treaty laws against U.S. officials who violate
those obligations, courts do not become agents of other nations.
Rather, the judicial branch upholds U.S. Constitutional principles
against violations by current officials. Just as the Supreme Court
assured aliens in the U.S. of equal protection under the 14th
amendment, so too, the courts must apply due process norms to
treaty violations. The President must faithfully execute the laws of
Congress or the Constitution. So too, the courts must require com-
pliance with treaty law. The Court's opinion in the Chinese Exclu-
sion case defies Constitutional law: "This court is not a censor of
the morals of the other departments of the government."' 9 Article
VI makes treaties far more than moral commands. The principle of
treaty priority would guard the U.S. legal system from political
abuse by public officials in the most legitimate exercise of judicial
review.
4. Customary International Law. Since "violation of a treaty is
essentially a violation of the principle of customary international
58. See HENKIN, supra note 2, at 168. In Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 430
F. Supp. 1168 (1977), the District Court endorsed the executive's right to breach a treaty.
The plaintiff had been blocked by the Coast Guard from landing at Hampton Roads (Nor-
folk, Va.) under the U.S. Special Interest Vessel Program because Polish nationals were
aboard. The plaintiff sought redress under the Convention on Facilitation of International
Maritime Traffic of 1967 but was denied relief. The district court judge reasoned that trea-
ties depend on the interest and honor of government parties for enforcement. If these fail,
then infractions become the subject of international negotiations and reclamations or possi-
bly war. "It is obvious that with all this, the courts have nothing to do and can give no
redress." 430 F. Supp. at 1172.
59. 130 U.S. 581, 602-03 (1889).
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law requiring that treaties be observed,"0 then Congress may es-
cape the obligation by enacting contrary municipal law. Courts
only follow customary international law until modified by
Congress.
In practice, U.S. courts have invalidated provisions of statutes
which contravened the law of nations. In U.S. v. Smith, the Su-
preme Court sustained the conviction of international pirates
under a U.S. criminal law, but ruled Congress had improperly clas-
sified murder as an act of piracy, exceeding the narrower limits
under international law."' In ex parte Quirin, the Court found the
U.S. Articles of War conformed both to the U.S. Constitution and
to the international laws of war.62 In Lauritzen v. Larsen, the
Court followed international maritime law rather than conflicting
jurisdictional provisions of the Jones Act.' s The Restatement con-
firms "[c]ases arising under international law or international
agreements of the United States are within the Judicial Power of
the United States, and subject to statutory limitations, are within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts."" Congress may not rou-
tinely legislate away customary international law obligations to
honor treaties. The President has a duty to take care that the laws,
including treaties, are faithfully executed.
5. Stare Decisis v. First Principles. The last-in-time principle,
it is argued, was derived early and has become firmly rooted as
well established law. With few exceptions, every legal treatise en-
cyclopedia and court decision for over a century has affirmed the
doctrine. Stare decisis reversal now would be disruptive.
In response, the historical overview presented above demon-
strates that the last-in-time rule did not emerge early in U.S. his-
tory. Corwin states that it first appeared in an 1854 opinion of the
Attorney General."' Justice Curtis' lower court opinion followed a
year later, and the Supreme Court did not affirm the rule until
1871. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention and the first
60. Henkin, supra note 2, at 460.
61. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
62. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
63. 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953). In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) the
second circuit found torture a violation of the law of nations and upheld jurisdiction in a
case involving aliens using U.S. courts for tort action. In Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.
Supp. 665 (D.C.D.C. 1980) the court found that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did
not bar prosecution for murder.
64. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 131, pars. 2.
65. CORWIN, CONSTTUTION, supra note 2, at 470 n. 57 (citing 6 Ops Att'y Gen. 291).
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legislators, cabinet members and judges never implemented the
last-in-time rule despite numerous opportunities during the na-
tion's first half century. To the contrary, many early leaders so
firmly stressed the binding nature of treaty commitments that
their acts lend considerable support to a principle of treaty prior-
ity. Ninteenth century positivists uprooted the treaty law princi-
ples planted by the founders. Changing attitudes toward interna-
tional law today dictate a return to the basic principles embodied
in the Constitution and honored by the framers.
Substitution of the treaty priority alternative would actually
simplify rather than disrupt judicial decision making. Courts pre-
sently lack clear guidance on whether or not Congress intended to
violate a prior treaty. As a result, the courts offer split decisions
which are often inconsistent. No such uncertainty would compli-
cate decision making under a treaty priority rule that required un-
ambiguous Congressional action. The courts would still retain con-
siderable discretion in deciding whether treaties are self-executing
and how the terms would be applied.
The last-in-time decisions reviewed above should dispel unset-
tling fears that new precedent would reverse a century of impor-
tant case law. Fewer than a dozen Supreme Court decisions actu-
ally cite the last-in-time rule as a basis for the holding. In the very
first, and fully half the remainder, the Court dealt with Indian
treaty disputes that could have been decided on alternate grounds.
In the few cases where Congress intentionally violated treaties, the
benefits hardly justify the attendant sacrifice to the rule of law.
How much did the U.S. gain by keeping a ranch for U.S. owner-
ship, terminating the employ of a Puerto Rican official, levying a
head tax on arriving aliens and by excluding Chinese immigrants?
Often, treaty renegotiation might have produced the same result
with minimal delay. In cases involving vital national interests, the
U.S. has alternative, under-utilized means to terminate, suspend or
withdraw from treaty commitments.
IV. CONCLUSION
The last-in-time rule was wrongly decided at its inception and
has been infrequently applied in practice. That doctrine unneces-
sarily violates a fundamental principle of U.S. Constituional law.
The U.S. judiciary should give treaties priority over later Congres-
sional acts until the government has terminated or modified its le-
gal obligations under the terms of the agreement or rules of inter-
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
national law.
For a century, U.S. judges have erroneously rationalized viola-
tion of law by U.S. officials. The last-in-time rule elevates to a
Constitutional principle a doctrine without regard for the rule of
law or national honor. The treaty priority alternative would re-es-
tablish fundamental first principles while confirming America's
willingness to honor its agreements. U.S. courts must recognize
that the Constitution creates a legal system in which Americans
are governed by law not only among themselves but also in their
relations with others.
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